only one starCritique by military historian and former army officer James Kenneth Bowen
MY RATING FOR THIS BOOK: only one star
The claim by Williams that the Australians were “rarely outnumbered” on the Kokoda Track and his suggested inference that the Australians were inferior fighters compared to the Japanese are readily exposed as more Williams historical howlers.
In this published doctoral thesis, Peter Williams suggests that the traditional view of heavily outnumbered Australian soldiers being forced back towards Port Moresby in bloody fighting on the Kokoda Track is another “Kokoda myth” that may have been invented to disguise the proclaimed Williams “truth” that the Australian defenders of Port Moresby were inferior soldiers compared to the veteran Japanese troops whom they ultimately defeated. Williams produces no credible evidence in this book to support these utterly false and insulting suggestions. To quote his words:
“According to the Kokoda myth, it was the large Japanese numerical superiority that enabled them to advance as far as they did towards Port Moresby…..In truth, during the Japanese advance (along the Kokoda Track towards port Moresby), the Australians were rarely outnumbered by their enemy….(so) other reasons for the series of Australian defeats on the Kokoda Track between July and September 1942 would be required. One possibility is that the Japanese were qualitatively superior to the Australians.” (At pages 1 and 2).
I urge readers to keep in mind at all times when assessing the credibility of very controversial claims by Peter Williams that he is the same author who produced the two aforementioned ridiculous howlers, namely, that Port Moresby was not the primary objective of the Japanese invaders who were fighting their way along the Kokoda Track to reach Port Moresby and that the Japanese probably knew more about the Kokoda Track than the Australian defenders of the track. In any sensible world, these appalling howlers should have produced rejection of this book by the publishers.
In an attempt to support these offensive and utterly false claims, Peter Williams makes particular reference to the first major actions against the Japanese invaders at Oivi on 26 July 1942, the first defence and fall of the Australian government station at Kokoda on 29 July 1942 (sometimes described as “First Kokoda”), and the Battle of Isurava (26-30 August 1942) to diminish the heroism and fighting qualities of Australian soldiers.
Although described by Williams as Australian defeats, the strategically vital military actions at Oivi, First Kokoda, and Isurava delayed and ultimately defeated the achievement by the Japanese of the primary objective of their invasion of Australia’s Papua territory in 1942, namely, the capture Port Moresby.
Before coming to the bloody fighting that followed the first Japanese landings on the northern coast of Australia’s Papua territory, it is appropriate for me to deal with the issues surrounding nomenclature. The powerful Japanese army responsible to Emperor Hirohito for capturing Port Moresby in 1942 was an elite formation responsible directly to the emperor through Imperial General Headquarters (Japan’s high command) which was located in the Imperial Palace grounds in Tokyo (“Senshi” at page 210). That special army formation has been variously called the South Seas Force, South Seas Detachment, Horii Detachment, and by its Japanese designation “Nankai Shitai”. I prefer to use Nankai Shitai because it avoids any possible confusion.
As I will further mention below when dealing with the landing of the Yokoyama Advance Force in Papua on 21 July 1942, Emperor Hirohito was a “hands on” commander-in-chief of Japan’s military forces and not a mere symbolic leader.
The Australian force that battled the Japanese from the initial landing on 21 July 1942 bore the code reference Maroubra Force. Until the Battle of Isurava, Maroubra Force included the militia 39th Battalion, the militia 53rd Battalion, the white officers and native soldiers of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, and handfuls of civilian ANGAU officers and native constabulary. During the five-day Battle of Isurava, the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions of the AIF 21st Brigade * became part of Maroubra Force. * 7th Division.
Without presenting any credible supporting historical evidence, Peter Williams claims that numbers of Japanese and Australians were roughly equal on both sides at Oivi, First Kokoda, and Isurava. The claims by Williams of rough equality of numbers at Oivi, First Kokoda, and Isurava are utterly demolished by reference to the official Australian and Japanese histories of the Kokoda Campaign, the known circumstances in which these actions took place, and relevant eyewitness, credible historical sources, and documentary evidence. All of this historical evidence is readily available to competent military historians, and I find myself compelled to a conclusion that Williams may have chosen to ignore any evidence that could expose as baseless his claim that numbers were roughly equal at Oivi, First Kokoda and Isurava. I also feel compelled to mention the readily available evidence that proves the Williams claim of rough parity of Japanese and Australian numbers at Oivi, First Kokoda, and Isurava lacks any credible historical support.
It may assist readers to follow these military actions by referring to my map below that indicates the locations of Oivi, Kokoda, Isurava and Alola on the Kokoda Track in 1942.
My map depicting the full length of the Kokoda Track can be seen at http://www.pacificwar.org.au/KokodaCampaign/Map_Kokoda.html
Notes:
The Kokoda Track is commonly viewed as beginning at Owers’ Corner about 50 kilometres north-east of Port Moresby and ending at Kokoda, but those travelling by foot on the narrow native track that begins a short distance south of the coastal villages of Gona and Buna, and leads to Kokoda, invariably referred to this track as “the Kokoda Track”. For the purposes of my Kokoda history, I accept this local usage and will treat the Kokoda Track as starting at Owers’ Corner and extending to the northern coast of Papua at Gona and Buna.
2. The distance between Gona and Buna on the Papuan coast is about 14 kilometres. Travelling east from Gona, the next village is Basabua, followed by Giruwa, and then Buna. The Japanese beachheads stretched from Gona to Buna.
* “Senshi” calls it the Yokohama Advance Party (at page 99). Either term may be used.
On 21 July 1942, invading troops of Japan’s Yokoyama Advance Force landed at Gona and Girawa (near Buna) on the northern coast of Australia’s Papua territory. The commander of this advance force was Colonel Yokoyama Yosuke, and the advance force included his 15th Independent Engineer Regiment, the 1/144th Tsukamoto Infantry Battalion*, a company of naval troops of the elite 5th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF)**, an anti-aircraft battalion, and a mountain artillery company.
* Following Japanese military practice, the name of Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto Hatsuo was assigned to his 1/144th Battalion.
** The company of elite 5th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force troops (usually about 260 men including a 42-man machine-gun platoon) landed close to Buna at Giruwa on 21 July 1942. See “Senshi” at page 106. Their assignment to the invasion of Australia’s Papua territory included defending the Japanese beachhead at Buna and supporting the 1/144th Tsukamoto Battalion, if needed, to capture the Australian government station at Kokoda.
Having regard to the claim by Peter Williams that “…during the Japanese advance (along the Kokoda Track towards Port Moresby) the Australians were rarely outnumbered”, it is necessary for me to provide the true numbers of Australians and Japanese at Oivi (26 July 1942) and First Kokoda (29 July 1942) drawn from credible historical evidence that destroys the Williams claims relating to these actions. Isurava can be left for later consideration because the numbers of both Australians and Japanese had increased by 26 August 1942. At Oivi and First Kokoda, the only troops involved were from the Tsukamoto Battalion and B Company of the Australian militia 39th Infantry Battalion, and the issue concerns the number of Japanese involved in those two major actions.
Without providing an exact number, “Senshi” puts the Tsukamoto Battalion at “sufficient in number” when it landed on the coast of Papua (at page 134). This is not particularly helpful, but we know that the rifle battalions of the 144th Infantry Regiment were standard Type B infantry battalions. We also know that the normal strength of a standard Type B Japanese infantry battalion in 1942 was about 1,100 men, and comprised: 1 HQ (headquarters) company, 4 rifle companies, 1 HMG (heavy machine-gun) company, and a battalion gun platoon. The battalion had 677 rifles, 37 LMG (light machine-guns), 36 LMRT* (light mortars less than 60mm calibre), 8 or 12 HMG (heavy machine-guns), and 2 x 70 mm battalion guns (i.e. light artillery). A standard Type B Japanese infantry company usually numbered 181 men and was equipped with 139 rifles, 9 light machine guns, and 9 LMRT.*
* An LMRT was often the Type 89 Grenade Discharger which was widely used in the Pacific War. This deadly Japanese 50mm calibre light infantry mortar had an effective range of about 150 metres. It was the Japanese equivalent of the Allied 2-inch light mortar.
The Japanese high command in Tokyo had assigned to Colonel Yokoyama the task of assessing the practicability of a Japanese army reaching and capturing Australia’s Port Moresby by crossing the Owen Stanley Range by means of the Kokoda Track (the “Ri Operation Study” - Senshi” at pages 94-95). “Senshi” also makes it very clear that the capture of Port Moresby carried top strategic priority for Japan in 1942 (pages 86-111) and Colonel Tsuji informed the 17th Army that Japan’s Commander-in-Chief Emperor Hirohito* was watching closely the Port Moresby operation (page 101).
It was glaringly apparent to me from reading this book that Williams had no real depth of knowledge of the Kokoda Campaign; and it was equally clear to me that he had no depth of knowledge of Japanese history. If he had that knowledge of Japanese history, he would have realised that there was no way massively understrength operations would be undertaken in Papua with the elite South Seas Force, when the Commander-in-Chief Emperor Hirohito was watching the Port Moresby operation closely. As I have mentioned elsewhere*, Hirohito carried the status of a god descended from the Shinto sun goddess Amaterasu, and this divine status was promoted by the State religion Shinto until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The worship of the emperor as a deity, and worthy of absolute devotion, was particularly strong in the Imperial Japanese military.
* “The national religion Shinto held that the emperor was divine, that Japan was blessed by the gods, and that Japan had a divine mission to extend its rule and enlightenment to less fortunate races. The education system was designed to condition students to blind loyalty to the emperor, obedience to his will, extreme patriotism, and support for Japan's military aggression.” See: http://www.pacificwar.org.au/FoundationJapMilagro.html
After the defeat of the first Port Moresby invasion plan in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 1941), and the crushing defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Battle of Midway (3-6 June 1942), Japan desperately need a victory by capturing Port Moresby, and this responsibility was passed by Hirohito to his army. The urgency of the Port Moresby operation was underlined to Major General Horii, the commander of the South Seas Force (Nankai Shitai) which included the Tsukamoto Battalion, by the commander of the 17th Army General Hyakutake Harukichi in an operational order dated 1 July 1942:
“2. The commander of the South Seas Force will land the force described below * in the Buna area and quickly advance to the saddle of the Owen Stanley Range to the south of Kokoda and evaluate the roads for an offensive against Port Moresby.” See “Senshi Sosho (AWM) at page 98.
* The “force described below” is identified as the Yokoyama Advance Party (or Force) at page 99 of “Senshi”.
The South Seas Force, also known as the Horii Detachment, was a unique formation directly controlled by Imperial General Headquarters (Daihon’ei) in Tokyo. Imperial General Headquarters was Japan’s High Command and it was located in the grounds of the Imperial Palace so that Emperor Hirohito, in his role as “hand on” commander-in-chief of Japan’s armed forces, could preside personally or through his staff officers over war planning.* The South Seas Force numbered about 5,500 elite jungle trained troops and was commanded by Major General Horii Tomitaro.** The mention by Lieutenant Colonel Tsuji of the emperor’s particular interest in the attack on Port Moresby would have underlined the high strategic priority attached to the Port Moresby offensive and render it highly unlikely that significantly understrength army units would be employed in the Port Moresby offensive. This aspect undermines immediately all of the claims by Peter Williams that understrength Japanese army units were employed in the attack on Port Moresby.
* Professor Herbert P. Bix, “Hirohito and the making of modern Japan” (2000) at page 327.
** In accordance with Japanese practice, I have placed the general’s family name first.
Despite the high strategic priority attached by Japan’s high command to the “Ri Operation Study”, Peter Williams suggests in a table at page 50 of this book that the 1/144th Tsukamoto Battalion landed on the coast of Papua at Gona with a strength of only 586 men. The Tsukamoto Battalion was a standard Japanese Type B infantry battalion which would normally comprise 1,100 men. If it landed on the coast of Papua with only 586 men, as suggested by Williams, it would have been massively understrength. A number of references are supplied by Williams to suggest an appearance of supporting that number of 586, including “Senshi” which he places as first or primary reference, but unfortunately for the credibility of Williams on this very important issue, I could find no support for this very low number of 586 in either paperback or ebook versions of “Senshi”. To confirm the absence of the number “586”, and a serious error by Williams on this issue, I used a search engine to look for that number in the digital version of “Senshi”, and did not find it.
The suggested Williams figure of only 586 men would indicate that a high priority strategic operation, closely watched by the emperor, had been assigned to a seriously understrength battalion. Having studied Japanese history for one year as part of my formal history studies, I would be prepared to argue strongly that Emperor Hirohito’s interest in the Kokoda Campaign would make landing of a massively understrength Tsukamoto Battalion numbering only 586 men at the Japanese beachheads highly unlikely, and the number of appalling historical howlers in this book suggest that Williams has fallen into another error on this important issue.
On the morning of 22 July 1942, the 1st or Ogawa Company* of the 1/144th Tsukamoto Battalion, supplemented with one 70mm field gun, and specialist machine-gun, 5th Sasebo SNLF, and engineer platoons (in total possibly numbering between 250 and 360 veteran troops**), left the beachhead at Buna in trucks and moved south towards the Australian government station at Kokoda to carry out a forward reconnaissance and any necessary repairs to bridges that might have been destroyed by the retreating Australians. The purpose of this forward reconnaissance was not for the Ogawa Company to capture Kokoda. The purpose of this reconnaissance was to assess the strength of possible Australian resistance and carry out any necessary bridge and other repairs to facilitate rapid movement towards Kokoda of the main strength of the Tsukamoto Battalion that was following several hours behind the Ogawa Company.
* Following Japanese military practice, the name of Captain Ogawa Tetsuo was assigned to his rifle company.
** If the Ogawa Company and its supporting specialist units were standard Type-B sizes, they would number in the order of 359 troops.
“Senshi” makes it very clear that capture of Kokoda had been assigned by Japan’s Imperial General Headquarters to the full strength of the Tsukamoto Battalion not to just one of its four rifle companies:
"As mentioned previously (at page 107), the 1st Battalion of the 144th Infantry Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto Hatsuo) was attached to the Yokoyama Advance Party, and occupied Kokoda on the morning of 29 July (1942). The battalion was ordered to secure the line of the Owen Stanley Range in preparation for a continued advance." (At page 135-136)
The urgency of the operation to capture Port Moresby was underlined by the commander of the South Seas Force (Nankai Shitai) Major General Horii Tomitaro for the Yokoyama Advance Force, including Horii’s own Tsukamoto Battalion, in the following operational order dated 14 July 1942:
“As quickly as possible advance with force to a line to the west of the Owen Stanley Range and to occupy and protect the line at all cost. Take precautions against enemy unit attacks.” (Horii Operational Order). See “Senshi Sosho” (AWM) at page 100).
This operational order makes it very clear that the Ogawa Company was only engaged on forward reconnaissance towards Kokoda and that it would be followed closely by the main strength of the Tsukamoto Battalion “as quickly as possible”. The “main strength” of the Tsukamoto Battalion comprised three additional rifle companies, an HQ (headquarters) company, a heavy machine-gun company (varying between 8 to 12 guns), and a battalion gun platoon (usually two light artillery 70mm guns).
Internationally recognised military historian, Samuel Milner,* records in his book “Victory in Papua”(1957) that the “main strength” of the Tsukamoto Battalion (numbering about 900 men) followed the Ogawa reconnaissance company later on the same day 22 July 1942 towards Kokoda:
“The evening of the landing (in context clearly 22 July 9142), an advance force under Lt Col Hatsuo Tsukamoto, commander of the infantry battalion, was organised at Giruwa and sent southward. The force was composed of the infantry battalion, an attached regimental signal unit, and a company of the 15th Independent Engineers. Tsukamoto, whose orders were "to push on night and day to the line of the mountain range," ** appears to have taken them literally. The attacking force, about 900 men, made its first bivouac that night just outside of Soputa, a point about seven miles inland, and by the following afternoon was approaching Wairopi (at pages 62-63). Reference 11. The emphasis is mine.
[Reference 11- Yokoyama Adv Tai Orders No. A-2, 16 Jul 42; Fld Log, Sakigawa Tai, Jul-Aug 42; Rad, Maj Toyonari Toyofuku, 17th Army Liaison Offr to CG 17th Army, 23 Jul 42; Yokoyama Adv Tai Rpt, 23 Jul 42. Last two in ATIS EP 28. COIC Rpt No. 316, 25 Jul 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA, 17th Army Opns, I, 21.]
* Samuel Milner (1910-2000) was a graduate military historian who served on General Douglas MacArthur’s staff in Australia in 1942. Under “Bibliographical Note”, he lists the Allied and Japanese sources to which he had access for the purpose of writing “Victory in Papua”.
** McCarthy at page 144.
The figure of "about 900 men" given by Samuel Milner for the main strength of the Tsukamoto Battalion that left Giruwa late on 22 July 1942 to follow the forward Ogawa reconnaissance company would bring the battalion up to the normal strength of a Japanese Type-B infantry battalion when it reached Oivi on 26 July. See "Senshi" at pages 107 and 135-136.
The first 16 kilometres of dirt road from Buna to Soputa were passable by the Japanese motor vehicles and troops on bicycles. The Japanese engineers worked intensively on the track south from Soputa to Sanbo to allow some movement of motor vehicles and to store munitions and supplies at Sanbo; but from Sanbo, access to Kokoda was only by foot or horseback along the northern Kokoda Track. See map above. On 26 July 1942, after short brushes with small Australian forces, the Ogawa Company reached the small Papuan village of Oivi which was located on the northern Kokoda Track and about two hours' march south-east of Kokoda.
The main strength of the 1/144th Tsukamoto Battalion and an unspecified number of 5th Sasebo naval troops* were following the Ogawa Company and began arriving at Oivi throughout the day and evening of 26 July (“Senshi Sosho” (AWM) at page 107). Based upon historian Samuel Milner's account, the total Japanese strength at Oivi by midnight on 26 July would probably have reached at least 1,000 elite army and SNLF troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto himself.
* The 5th Sasebo SNLF troops would be unlikely to number less than one platoon. A standard SNLF rifle platoon usually numbered 54 men.
This is confirmed by Staff Sergeant Imanishi of the 2nd Company who describes the main strength of the Tsukamoto Battalion as “…advancing after the forward (Ogawa) units, (and) was now starting to trickle through to join them at the enemy’s front line at Oivi. Japanese troops pressed in on the defender’s with a frontal attack.” *
* “The Path of infinite Sorrow - The Japanese on the Kokoda Track”. Ebook reference Chapter 6: “The Taking of Kokoda”.
This account clearly indicates that the Ogawa Company was supported by other companies of the Tsukamoto Battalion as they arrived at Oivi on 26 July 1942.
A fierce action between a small Australian force at Oivi and the entire Japanese Tsukamoto Battalion with supporting SNLF troops would take place on 26 July 1942 (McCarthy at pages 126-127; “Senshi" at pages 106-107).
The commander of the Australian militia 39th Battalion at Kokoda, Lieutenant Colonel William Owen, had ordered his small Australian force at Oivi to hold their ground at all costs unless the Australians risked being surrounded and cut off by the Japanese invaders. If that happened, the Australians were ordered to fall back to Kokoda. The official Australian history of the Kokoda Campaign (my abbreviation “McCarthy”) and unit diaries indicate that the small Australian force at Oivi comprised two and a half 39th Battalion platoons, a handful of native Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) soldiers and their white officers, and a handful of Papuan native police - in total about 90-95 men. The Australians were only armed with rifles, hand grenades, and light machine-guns.
The Japanese launched repeated massed attacks against the small Australian force at Oivi from 1500hrs (3.00 pm) on 26 July 1942. An Australian officer observed and identified elite Japanese naval troops (SNLF) taking part in these attacks from the distinctive anchor insignia on their uniforms.* In what appears to be a consistent pattern of ignoring credible evidence that the Australians were heavily outnumbered at Oivi and First Kokoda, Williams ignores the presence of elite naval troops at Oivi.
* “Those ragged bloody heroes” (1991), Peter Brune - observation of Lieutenant D. McClean MC, 39th Battalion. Japanese army troops did not wear anchor insignia.
The pressure from the Japanese forced the Australians into a tight perimeter defence about 50 metres in diameter with the Japanese swarming to within a few metres of the perimeter before they were killed. As dusk was falling, the Japanese had accumulated sufficient numbers to encircle completely the Australian defensive perimeter, and the Australians were taking heavy machine-gun and mortar fire from all around their perimeter. The Australian commander Major W. T. Watson felt that his force was heavily outnumbered because the Japanese were pressing the Australians so closely despite their heavy losses, and were bringing fire to bear on his men from an estimated twenty light machine-guns.* The small Australian force appeared to be facing annihilation when Lance Corporal Sanopa of the PIB saved them. Under cover of darkness, the resourceful Sanopa led the Australians to safety by means of a creek flowing through dense jungle. The Japanese were swarming around Oivi in such massive numbers, that the Australians could not reach Kokoda along the Kokoda Track but had to travel across rugged terrain to the village of Deniki which lay south of Kokoda.
* McCarthy at pages 126-127.
To support his claim that the Australians were “rarely outnumbered” when fighting the Japanese on the Kokoda Track to defend Port Moresby from capture, and his suggested inference from successive initial defeats that the Australians were inferior soldiers compared to the Japanese, Peter Williams claims (at pages 49-50) that the small Australian force at Oivi was facing only one Japanese army company, the Ogawa Company, supplemented by specialist platoons comprising light artillery, heavy machine-guns, and engineer platoons (his suggested total being about 230 Japanese troops) instead of the full strength of the veteran 1/144th Tsukamoto Battalion with its four rifle companies, light artillery, light mortars, and heavy machine guns (normal strength between 900-1100 assault troops). He ignores the observed presence at Oivi of 5th Sasebo SNLF troops (Brune, ibid.). In his own words:
“The main body of the 1/144th (Tsukamoto Battalion)….did not leave (the coast) until the evening of 29 July (1942) …“..it was Ogawa’s advance guard, about 230 men, that did all the fighting against the Papuans and Australians up to and including the first Kokoda engagement on 29 July 1942” ( at pages 49-50).
Although Williams mentions “the first Kokoda engagement on 29 July 1942”, I will leave until I reach First Kokoda the compelling evidence that the main strength of the Tsukamoto Battalion took part in the attack on and fall of Kokoda on 29 July 1942.
Williams does not offer any evidence, credible or otherwise, to support his very controversial claim that “The main body of the 1/144th (Tsukamoto Battalion)….did not leave (the coast) until the evening of 29 July (1942)”, and it is utterly destroyed by the official Japanese history “Senshi Sosho (AWM)” with these words:
"..The (Ogawa) unit then advanced to the high ground at Oivi approximately 16 kilometres to the east of Kokoda, where they were joined by the main strength* of the advance party (1/144th Battalion) on 26 July (1942)". (Emphasis added by me). See: "Senshi" at pages 106-107.
* As indicated above the “main strength” of the Tsukamoto Battalion comprised three additional rifle companies, an HQ (headquarters) company, a heavy machine-gun company (varying between 8 to 12 guns), and a battalion gun platoon (usually two light artillery 70mm guns).
Peter Williams makes no attempt to mention or challenge “Senshi Sosho” (AWM) on this crucial point, despite the clear evidence from Japan’s official history that the small Australian force were facing the full strength of the Tsukamoto Battalion at Oivi.
“Senshi" is supported by Japanese Staff Sergeant Imanishi Sadashige of the 2nd Company of the Tsukamoto Battalion who was present at both Oivi on 26 July 1942 and First Kokoda on 29 July 1942, and every other authoritative history of Kokoda since 1942. I could find no mention by Williams of Staff Sergeant Imanishi’s account of his presence with the 2nd Company of the Tsukamoto Battalion at Oivi on 26 July and First Kokoda on 29 July1942.*
* “The Path of infinite Sorrow - The Japanese on the Kokoda Track”. Ebook reference Chapter 6: “The Taking of Kokoda”.
Observed and Unchallenged aspects of Oivi that support “Senshi Sosho” (AWM) and contradict Williams
There are additional soundly based historical reasons to reject the assertion by armchair historian Peter Williams that the Australians at Oivi were under attack by only one Japanese Ogawa Company (about 230 men) as utter nonsense.
Having regard to the number of Japanese killed and wounded as they pressed home repeated attacks on the Australians over several hours and into the night, it appears highly unlikely that only one Japanese company could apply such pressure for so long around a defensive perimeter that, applying mathematics and military common sense, was probably between 120 and 150 metres in length (i.e. less than two Japanese per metre of perimeter).
Williams makes no reference to the observed presence of Japanese SNLF troops at Oivi and that alone makes his numbers at Oivi wrong.
Staff Sergeant Imanishi does not mention the role of his 2nd Company at Oivi on 26 July, but he confirms the presence of his 2nd Company at “First Kokoda” on 29 July describing his hearing a shouted: “‘Charge’, then sounds of hand grenades and gunshots continued after that. It stopped sometimes, but again you hear sounds of twenty or thirty shots and then someone screams ‘Move and charge’.” *
* Ibid. at Chapter 6 - “The taking of Kokoda”.
If Major Watson's estimate that the Japanese were bringing fire to bear on his men from twenty light machine-guns at Oivi is correct (McCarthy at pages 126-127), and that number is neither mentioned or challenged by Williams, it is highly probable that the Australians were surrounded at Oivi by a force much larger than one Japanese Ogawa Company as claimed by Peter Williams because a standard Japanese Type B Rifle Company is normally equipped with only 9 light machine-guns.
Why does Peter Williams ignore credible evidence that challenges his claim that the Australians were only “rarely outnumbered” on the Kokoda Track and his suggested inference from that claim that the Australians were inferior fighters compared to the Japanese? We are entitled to ask whether Williams ignored this credible evidence because it effectively destroys his claim that the Australian’s were not heavily outnumbered at Oivi and First Kokoda and appears to drive the equivalent of a horse and carriage through his PhD thesis.
LEFT: Aerial view of the Kokoda plateau in 1942; RIGHT: the sharp drop from the top of the Kokoda plateau to the valley floor is about 21 metres (70 feet). The writer stood on the edge of the plateau with
the Kokoda assistant district officer in 1961. The failure of armchair academic historian Peter Williams to understand the dynamics of battle are demonstrated by an examination of the steep Kokoda plateau.
The Australians numbered about 100 and were dug in all around the top edge of the Kokoda plateau. Williams suggests, without any support from historical facts, that only 200 * Japanese quickly overran
the Australian positions on top of the plateau. The official Japanese history of the Kokoda Campaign "Senshi Sosho" makes it very clear that the Australians were overwhelmed by the full Japanese Tsukamoto Battalion (between 850-900 men) armed with artillery, mortars, and heavy machine guns.
* Williams suggests the Japanese numbered only 200 at page 54.
Believing that the Australians at Oivi had been surrounded and probably annihilated by the Japanese, Lieutenant Colonel Owen withdrew the rest of his small force from Kokoda to Deniki where he found that Major Watson had arrived with some survivors of Oivi a couple of hours earlier. When another group of survivors of Oivi arrived at Deniki and informed Owen that the Japanese had not yet reached Kokoda, Owen decided to attempt a defence of the vital Kokoda airstrip with a very small force of undertrained militia troops of his 39th Battalion, civilian ANGAU officers, native police, and undertrained native PIB soldiers. This mixed force totalled only about 80 (McCarthy at page 127); but it was joined at Kokoda by about 20 PIB soldiers who had been scattered during earlier contacts with the Japanese.
The small Australian force dug in on the three open sides of the Kokoda plateau and awaited the expected arrival of the Japanese which they expected to outnumber them heavily. The Australians defending Kokoda were only armed with rifles, light machine-guns, and hand grenades.
The Japanese attack began at about 2.00 am on 29 July when the Japanese began to lay down artillery, heavy machine-gun, and mortar fire on the Kokoda plateau defenders. By 3.30 am the Japanese had swarmed over all three open sides of the Kokoda plateau and were overwhelming the Australian defenders. Lieutenant Colonel Owen was killed and the surviving Australians withdrew down the Kokoda Track to Deniki.
The fall of Kokoda to the Japanese invaders on 29 July 1942 is sometimes called First Kokoda.
According to Peter Williams (at page 54) only one company from the Japanese 1/144th Tsukamoto Battalion fought the Australians at First Kokoda on 29 July 1942, and he identifies this Japanese force of about 200 troops as being the Ogawa Company supported by specialist troops (light artillery, heavy machine-guns, and engineer platoons).
Williams claims that the main strength of the 1/144th Tsukamoto Battalion was not present at Kokoda on 29 July 1942 (or the earlier fierce action at Oivi on 26 July) because it was back at the Japanese Buna beachhead when these two actions were taking place (at pages 49 and 53); and drawing on his own words:
“The main body of the 1/144th (Tsukamoto Battalion)….did not leave (the coast) until the evening of 29 July (1942)” (at page 49)…. “Apparently during the battle (First Kokoda) ‘400 of Tsukamoto’s 900-strong force charged up the short steep slope’ of the Kokoda plateau. (Ref 17)* This did not happen. It is the Kokoda myth, for Tsukamoto, with the main body of the 1/144th (Battalion), was still on the coast (Buna) a hundred kilometres away and did not pass through Oivi until 6 August. (Ref 18)” **(at pages 49-53).
JKB - The emphasis on 6 August is mine because 6 August is clearly wrong. See next paragraph.
* 17 - The reference is to Paul Ham’s “Kokoda” (2013) at pp.49-53.
** 18 - The reference is to one page numbered “Appendix F” from the 39th Battalion War Diary which appears to be a translation from an unknown source. This page cannot have any authority because it contains major dating errors. See image below.
It appears to be very clear with reference to the Tsukamoto Battalion that “main strength” and “main body” mean the same. I will demonstrate that Williams offers no evidence, credible or otherwise, to support these very controversial claims, and that they are utterly destroyed by the official Japanese history “Senshi".
Despite the importance of these claims to proof by Williams that the “inferior” Australians were “rarely outnumbered” on the Kokoda Track, and arguably, to the credibility of his PhD award, he produces no reference and no evidence to support his claim that “The main body of the 1/144th….did not leave (the coast) until the evening of 29 July (1942) * at page 49). This appalling absence of proof confirms my belief that no one connected with publication of this book had any depth of knowledge of the fighting on the Kokoda Track.
* i.e. 8 days after the initial landing on. 21 July 1942! “Senshi" makes it very clear that the capture of Port Moresby carried top strategic priority for Japan in 1942 (pages 86-111). This ridiculous claim by Williams suggests that Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto was taking a holiday on the beach for eight days at Buna instead of pushing inland as required by his orders from Major General Horii dated 14 July 1942. See: Horii operational order above.
Then we have the ridiculous claim by Williams regarding the location of the “main body”, i.e. main strength of the Tsukamoto Battalion at the time of Oivi on 26 July and First Kokoda on 29 July 1942, namely:
“Tsukamoto, with the main body of the 1/144th (Battalion), was still on the coast (at Buna) a hundred kilometres away and did not pass through Oivi until 6 August. Ref 18” *(at page 53).
Although mentioned earlier in relation to Oivi, the following text quotation from “Senshi Sosho” (AWM) is equally relevant to exposing as nonsense the claim by Williams that the Tsukamoto Battalion was not present at either Oivi on 26 July or the attack on Kokoda on 29 July 1942:
"..The (Ogawa) unit then advanced to the high ground at Oivi approximately 16 kilometres to the east of Kokoda, where they were joined by the main strength* of the advance party (1/144th Battalion) on 26 July (1942)". (Emphasis added by me). See: "Senshi" at pages 106-107.
* “Main strength” or “main body”explained below.
When "Senshi" refers to the "main strength" of the advance party joining the Ogawa unit, ie. Company, on 26 July 1942 at Oivi, it means that the rest of the 1/144th Tsukamoto Battalion, i.e. three additional rifle companies, an HQ company, a heavy machine-gun company (varying between 8 to 12 guns), and a battalion gun platoon (usually two light artillery 70mm guns), joined the Ogawa Company at Oivi on 26 July. The standard Japanese Type B infantry battalion was also usually equipped with as many as 36 deadly 50mm portable grenade launchers.
If that was not clear enough to refute utterly the claim by Williams of near equality of numbers in the first defence of Kokoda on 29 July 1942, and his suggested inferiority of Australian soldiers, “Senshi" declares at pages 135-136:
"As mentioned previously (at page 107), the 1st Battalion of the 144th Infantry Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto Hatsuo) was attached to the Yokoyama Advance Party, and occupied Kokoda on the morning of 29 July (1942). The battalion was ordered to secure the line of the Owen Stanley Range in preparation for a continued advance."
The Australian official history joins “Senshi Sosho” (AWM) in crushing the claim by Williams that the Australians were fighting only one Japanese company at First Kokoda on 29 July:
“Once he got most of his force ashore Yokoyama lost no time in pressing inland. Tsukamoto led the advance with his I/144th Battalion, his orders to "push on night and day to the line of the mountain range", and he it was who drove the Australians back to Kokoda and occupied that area on the morning of 29th July .” (McCarthy at page 144)
Kokoda fell to the Japanese on the morning of 29 July 1942. So the official Japanese history is declaring unequivocally that Tsukamoto's full battalion took part in the first defence and fall of Kokoda on 29 July. This can arguably be seen as a crushing blow to the credibility of Peter Williams’ PhD award.
Peter Williams again makes no attempt to challenge “Senshi” on this. He simply pursues what appears to be an emerging pattern of ignoring anything that would destroy a major thrust of his PhD thesis, namely, his apparent intention to diminish Kokoda by claiming without any credible proof that the Australians were “rarely outnumbered” by the Japanese on the Kokoda Track, and consequently, challenge his suggestion that the Australians were inferior soldiers compared to the Japanese. Perhaps times have changed, but my senior lecturer in history at the University of Queensland would have rightly censured me in front of my history class if I had attempted to ignore historical evidence that challenged my views.
“The only “evidence” Williams can offer to support his extraordinary claim that the main body (or main strength) of the Tsukamoto Battalion was “still on the coast (Buna)…. and did not pass through Oivi until 6 August” is his Reference 18 which leads us to a translated “Appendix F” which is one of a series of appendices to the 39th Battalion War Diary (see image below). The sources of some of these appendices, including “Appendix F”, are not clear. Some purport to be translations of captured Japanese soldier’s diaries. Whatever the source of “Appendix F” may be, it is worthless as historical evidence because important dates mentioned in this faded and yellowed document for both Oivi (6 August) and First Kokoda (14 August) are wrong. There was no “four-day” battle for either First or Second Kokoda, and no actions took place between Australians and Japanese on either date.
And see enlarged clip from Paragraph 3 below.
So Williams has built the major thrust of his PhD thesis and this book, namely, the claim of rough parity of Japanese and Australian numbers for most of the Japanese advance towards Port Moresby on the Kokoda Track, on a foundation that simply does not exist. It is surely arguable that this appalling howler has struck another deadly blow at his credibility with regard to Kokoda and the credibility of everyone associated with publication of this appalling book. Surely we are entitled to ask “Did Williams really think that no one would check this reference and discover it was nonsense?”
One probably needs to be an armchair academic even to imagine that only 200 Japanese could manage the steep climb under Australian fire to the top of the Kokoda plateau and then swarm over all three open sides of that plateau (total length about 600 metres) to overwhelm quickly the prepared Australian defences. It follows irresistibly from the Japanese account in “Senshi” that about 100 lightly armed Australians were facing a full Japanese battalion (between 855 and 900 men) equipped with heavy weapons in the first defence of Kokoda and not merely the Ogawa Company.
The unsupported claim by Williams of near equality of numbers in the first defence of Kokoda on 29 July 1942 appears intended to diminish the heroism of the Australian defenders who were fighting a much larger and more powerful Japanese force.
Again, we are left wondering why no one connected with the publication of this deeply flawed treatment of Kokoda appeared to have sufficient depth of knowledge of the Kokoda Campaign to detect and correct these appalling Williams errors.
The Japanese do not share the suggestion from Williams that Australia’s Kokoda heroes were inferior fighters. In the Japanese official history "Senshi Sosho" (AWM), the Japanese themselves pay tribute to the Australians as tough fighters. In the splendid documentary "Kokoda - The Bloody Track" (1992), Japanese survivors of the Kokoda Campaign paid high tributes to the fighting qualities of the Australians on the Kokoda Track. Proof of the magnificent fighting qualities of the Australians can be found in the fact that the seriously undertrained, poorly equipped, and poorly supplied militia 39th Battalion blocked the advance of veteran Japanese assault troops on the northern and southern stretches of the Kokoda Track for five weeks, and so gave time for AIF 7th Division veterans to reach Isurava.